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As is all too apparent to state legislators across the nation, Dela-
ware has controlled both the pace and direction of statutory corporate
law in the twentieth century. Delaware's position in corporate law
stems largely from the fact that Delaware law is considered more favor-
able to management than the law of any other state.' Thus, to prevent
corporations from deserting to the healthful climes of Delaware law,
state legislators have been forced to relax local laws regulating internal
corporate affairs,2 and statutory protection of the public, shareholders,
and corporate creditors has often been sacrificed.'
Not all states have been enthusiastic about statutorily favoring
management in order to compete with states of lesser commercial im-
portance. However, primarily because they felt powerless to resist, most
states have to some extent acquiesced and followed Delaware's lead.4
In contrast to the pro-management bias of Delaware law, Califor-
nia has traditionally emphasized protection of the interests of corporate
1. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L.
Rv. 433, 436-37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan].
2. A short definition of internal corporate affairs is "the relations inter se of the
corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNP'Icr OF LAWS § 302, comment a at 307 (1971). A more expansive defini-
tion was provided by the Supreme Court of Maryland in 1885: "[W]here the act com-
plained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation,
whether it be as stockholder, director, president, or other officer, and is the act of the
corporation, whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through its agents, the board
of directors, then such action is the management of the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion. .. ." North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A.
1039, 1040 (1885). The basic distinction to be made is between acts peculiar to corpo-
rations (internal affairs) and acts performed by individuals as well as corporations (ex-
ternal affairs). See Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice
of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Reese & Kaufman].
3. Some states have even attempted to "out-Delaware Delaware." Downs, Michi-
gan to Have a New Corporations Code?, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 913, 914 (1972). However,
"Delaware understandably does not wish to surrender its lead. Amending its law in
1969, and again in 1970 and 1971, it is setting the pace." Cary, Federalism and Cor-
porate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Cary].
4. The classic statement is that of "the Governor of Michigan, in his 1921 mes-
sage to the Michigan Legislature. . .that it was useless to pass a stringent corporation
act because 'all of our corporations will come back to us as foreign corporations.'" Kap-
lan, supra note 1, at 436.
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shareholders and creditors. 5 As will be shown, the ability of corpora-
tions to change domiciles freely creates a tension between permissive
states such as Delaware and more regulatory states such as California.
This tension has led to the inclusion in California's revision of its
corporation law6 of a section that attempts to combat the power of the
permissive states. The success of California's effort should be of great
interest nationwide. A successful effort by California to remedy the
current ease with which corporations can avoid undesirable aspects of
local law would offer all states an alternative to the surrender of impor-
tant prerogatives to Delaware and other permissive jurisdictions.7
California's effort takes on special importance in light of the
increasing interest in a federal statute to replace the current "lowest
common denominator" system8 of state corporate law. 9 There is a
vigorous defense to be made, of course, for the rights of states to control
their local affairs and for the existence of local laboratories for the law. 10
But these arguments will not fend off federal intervention forever if the
states cannot provide corporate regulation sufficient to protect the public
interest. Arguably some states will favor a federal role as actually
entailing a smaller reduction of their power to determine the nature of
the governing corporation statute. All states have representation in
Congress where their interests are likely to receive at least some consid-
eration, whereas Delaware has demonstrated a tendency to ignore the
interests of other states. On the other hand, it is clear that for Califor-
nia and the other states which have been able to retain a relatively
5. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor
Protection, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958).
6. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 100-2319 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). For
the history of the legislation, see Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Cor-
poration in California: Progress and Problems, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 434 (1975).
7. Also at stake are incorporation fees. The desire for this revenue has been a
prime factor in Delaware's behavior. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 13 n.l1 (4th ed. 1969).
The fact that Delaware is "doing it for the money" may influence one's view of
the propriety of the situation. Consider what one writer said as Delaware followed lib-
eral New Jersey: "Little Delaware, gangrened with envy at the spectacle of the truck-
patchers, sand-duners, clam-diggers and mosquito wafters of New Jersey getting all the
money in the country into her coffers,-is determined to get her little, tiny, sweet, round,
baby hands into the grab-bag of sweet things before it is too late." Note, Little Dela-
ware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 33 AM. L. REv. 418, 419 (1899).
8. Cary, supra note 3, at 663.
9. See id., supra note 3; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 480; Symposium-An In-
depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31
Bus. LAw 869 (1976); Symposium-Federal Chartering of Corporations, 61 GEO. L.J.
71 (1972).
10. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (dissent-
ing opinion).
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greater regulatory thrust in their corporation codes, an increased federal
presence would entail the loss of a great deal of legislative autonomy.
The key to preventing federal assumption of corporate regulation is
proof that the states can and will provide adequate protection for
shareholders and creditors. Scholars considering the question differ on
whether the states have the ability to break Delaware's grip on the law of
corporations. Some flatly conclude that "[s]tate action cannot be
effective in providing a responsible corporate statute"'- and urge feder-
al standards as the best solution. Other writers have concluded that the
means are currently available although some doubt that the states have
the will to implement them.' 2 The California statute may present the
last opportunity for the states to provide the answers to such questions
and to prove that they can handle the Delaware problem.
This note discusses the potential of the California statute as a
means to combat the influence of the permissive states over corporate
law. To ascertain the probable impact and success of California's
statute, this note explores two major areas: (1) the mechanics of the
statute and whether the loopholes it contains can be expected to vitiate
its effectiveness and (2) whether the statute is so burdensome that
foreign corporations operating in California will seek to avoid its appli-
cation. Brief consideration is first given to the background of the
Delaware problem and the solution California offers.
The Status Quo: The Delaware Problem
The inordinate leverage of Delaware, the most permissive state
since 1913, arises from the combination of three facts: (1) corporations
have historically been accorded complete freedom of choice in selecting
and changing the situs of their corporate domicile;' 3 (2) corporations
able to afford such luxuries will choose the regulatory system interfering
least with management's power over the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion; (3) courts have nurtured this system by adopting a conflict of laws
rule that the law governing the corporation's internal affairs is that of
the state of incorporation.' 4 Given these facts, the most permissive state
has tremendous influence because, from the viewpoint of management,
11. Cary, supra note 3, at 668.
12. The strongest argument is made by Professor Latty. See Latty, Psuedo-For-
eign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Latty]. Professor
Kaplan also concludes that states have the power although he doubts that they have the
inclination to use it. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 478.
13. The concept of corporate domicile is so artificial that employment of that term
can be criticized. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLiCS LAw 26-28 (1968). For con-
venience, however, domicile and domiciliary are used throughout this note to designate
the state of incorporation.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLict OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
September 1976]
it is the most desirable place in which to incorporate. This note does
not purport to pass judgment on the wisdom of regulatory versus
permissive statutory schemes. Each state must achieve what it believes
is the proper balance between the legitimate needs of management and
the legitimate interests of investors. 15 Yet the present system must be
condemned because it makes it difficult or even futile for many states to
enact corporate statutes significantly more regulatory than Delaware's.
At the core of the current situation is the conflict of laws rule that
"[p]urely internal corporate affairs and management are governed by
the law of the state of creation."'16 This deference to the law of the
domiciliary state allows a corporation to immunize itself from the regu-
lation of its internal affairs by the law of states in which it operates.
Simply stated, the potential for corporations to insulate themselves from
local law puts a state in a defensive position with respect to the stringen-
cy of its corporate statute if an alternative more favorable to manage-
ment is provided by another state. Such an alternative was supplied by
New Jersey in 1896 when it adopted what is regarded as the first of the
modern liberal general corporation statutes. Delaware copied the New
Jersey statute so that when New Jersey strengthened its law relating to
15. See Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way,
31 Bus. LAW 991 (1976).
16. 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8326,
at 110 (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]. The origins of the rule are
ancient. When first chartered by English kings, corporations were conceived as artificial
beings existing only by virtue of the sovereign's largesse and thus were subject to the
sovereign's regulatory power. See Berle, Historical Inheritance of American Corpora-
tions, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS: No. 3-THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 189, 192-93 (1950); Williston, History of Business Corpora-
tions Before 1800 (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 149 (1888). American courts
adopted this analysis as shown by Chief Justice Marshall's description of the corporate
entity as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819). When corporations began to operate in states other than the state creating
them, comity between the states led to the practice of "recognizing" the corporation for
the purpose of doing business there. See FLETCHER, supra, §§ 8330-46; R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 597 (1968). Until recently, this rule often took a rather
extreme form. Some courts even refused to take jurisdiction over suits involving the in-
ternal affairs of foreign corporations on the ground that such matters should be left for
adjudication by courts in the state of incorporation. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 123 (1933); FLETCHER, supra, § 8425; LEFLAR, supra, at 606-09; Annot., 155
A.L.R. 1231 (1945); Note, The "Internal Affairs" Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA.
L. REV. 666 (1949). Courts justified their position on the grounds of the difficulty of
a foreign court interpreting and applying a foreign law or of their inability to enforce
a decree. This approach, the so-called "internal affairs doctrine," is now subsumed in
the relatively new doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Williams v. Green Bay &
W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the In-
ternal Affairs Rule, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 234 (1958).
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corporations and trusts in 1913,' r Delaware continued to offer the
liberal alternative. The presence of a more permissive statute left to
other states no choice but to imitate its liberality. As Justice Brandeis
observed in Liggett Co. v. Lee:
[l]t was futile to insist upon [stricter requirements]; because local
restriction would be circumvented by foreign incorporation. In-
deed, local restriction seemed worse than futile.. .. Mhe great
industrial States yielded in order not to lose wholly the prospect
of the revenue and the control incident to domestic incorporation.18
Thus, states have faced a dilemma: how to retain control over corpora-
tions operating within their borders without diluting the protection
afforded by domestic law to minority shareholders, creditors, and others
endangered by unscrupulous corporate practices.
Tackling the Delaware Problem: The Background to
California's Attempt
No state has yet devised and consistently applied an approach that
adequately deals with the Delaware problem. This is true notwithstand-
ing occasional judicial attempts to apply local law to foreign corpora-
tions and various attempted statutory solutions.' 9 The failure to devise
a means adequate to break the leverage of the most permissive state has
occurred despite the holding in Paul v. Virginia20 that a corporation is
not a citizen within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause
and that, therefore, a state has the power to refuse a corporation permis-
sion to do intrastate business within its borders.2 ' The primary use to
which states have put this power is the requirement that foreign corpora-
tions register before doing intrastate business and submit to local service
of process.22 Such requirements have slight impact on the internal
affairs of corporations.23
It is clear, however, that a state's right to refuse a foreign corpora-
tion entrance into the state is not limited to achieving such minimal
17. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORAToNS 9 (4th ed. 1969).
18. 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933) (dissenting in part).
19. See notes 37-39 & accompanying text infra.
20. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
21. The corollary of this principle is that a state has no power to exclude a foreign
corporation for doing interstate business. The reason that a state can discriminate
against a foreign corporation at all is that a corporation is not a "person" within the
meaning of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution (privileges and im-
munities clause). See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
22. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6403-09 (West 1955 & Supp. 1976) (eff. until
Jan. 1, 1977); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT §§ 110-15 (1971 & Supp. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL AcT].
23. In fact, the Model Business Corporation Act specifically states that "nothing
in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the organiza-
tion or internal affairs of such a corporation." MODEL Acr, supra note 22, § 106.
September 1976]
purposes. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 4 the Supreme
Court upheld Virginia's right to require a Delaware corporation to
incorporate its Virginia operations in Virginia.25 In rejecting the corpo-
ration's argument that this burdened the interstate commerce in which ft
was primarily engaged, Justice Holmes commented:
[Virginia] simply is refusing -to grant a foreign corporation a per-
mit to transact local business without taking out a charter from thejurisdiction within which that business must be done. There is no
substantial evidence that the refusal would impose a burden on in-
terstate commerce and it is presumed to be constitutional.2 6
In light of modem commercial affairs, however, the wisdom of a univer-
sal application of such an approach is questionable.17  Breaking what
are now large corporate units into a separate unit within each state
would doubtless impair corporate efficiency and have a negative impact
on the national economy. The fact that this approach has not been
more frequently used suggests that the states believe the public interest
to be better served by the current system.
Individual state courts have occassionally refused to follow the
general rule of looking to the law of the domiciliary state to govern the
corporation's conduct of its internal affairs.2 8  These cases generally
have involved foreign corporations operating entirely within the state in
which the court was sitting and which were "foreign" only in the sense
that it was incorporated in another state. Such corporations are gener-
ally denominated "pseudo-foreign corporations, '29 and in the course of
applying local law to them, courts have used such descriptions as "tramp"
or "migratory,"3 or have remarked that their "residence . . . anywhere
else outside of California, is the merest fiction."' The most noted case
24. 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
25. This case is an example of the power of the state to require a foreign corpora-
tion to become "domesticated." See FLETCHER, supra note 16, § 8303; H. HENN, LAW
OF CORPORATIONS 236 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HEN].
26. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 444 (1930).
27. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 444-45.
28. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298,
31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); German-American Coffee
Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
29. The term "pseudo-foreign corporation" is not used in the new California code,
but it is used in the legislative report concerning the revision. See REPORT OF THE AS-
SEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE CORPORATIONS CODE (1975) [here-
inafter cited as REVISION COMMITTEE REPORT].
30. See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 114 Ky. 892,
896-97, 72 S.W. 4, 5 (1903); State v. Georgia Co., 112 N.C. 34, 41, 17 S.E. 10, 12
(1893); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 122, 141 P.2d 571, 573
(1943).
31. Wait v. Kern River Mining Etc. Co., 157 Cal. 16, 21, 106 P. 98, 100 (1909).
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not following the general rule is Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson,32 which involved a family lumber business, incorporated in
Delaware but doing all of its business in Louisiana. 3 In an action for
rescission of the sale of their stock, the minority shareholders alleged
that the majority had engaged in fraud to acquire the minority's stock at
an unfair price while planning to liquidate corporate assets at an inordi-
nate profit. The Louisiana district court applied Louisiana law and
found for the plaintiffs.3 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit initially affirmed,35 but a rehearing was granted following
a strong protest by the defendants that Delaware law should have been
applied. The Fifth Circuit responded:
Those decisions... are, however, in our opinion, either inappli-
cable or unsound where the only contact point with the incorpo-
rating state is the naked fact of incorporation, and where all other
contact points ... are found in another jurisdiction .... [W]here
neither the charter nor the statutory laws of the incorporating state
are applicable, and all contact points are in the forum, we believe
that the laws of the forum should govern. 36
Applying local law to corporations which are essentially local in
character as in Mansfield represents at least one method of defeating the
benefits of foreign incorporation. However, a case-by-case application
of local law only captures those foreign corporations which are before
local courts in lawsuits involving their internal affairs. In addition, the
decision to apply local law would be left to individual judges, many of
whom may be hesitant to leave the firm ground of the general rule.
Finally, having no guidance in differentiating between the real foreign
corporation and the pseudo-foreign corporation, courts would most
likely apply local law only to those foreign corporations doing all of
their business within the jurisdiction of the court. And it is possible
that the number of corporations falling into this group is so small that
this method of applying local law would do little to ease the grip of the
permissive states.
These weaknesses are eliminated if the legislature undertakes to
develop a statutory set of guidelines. A statutory approach facilitates
the adoption of a definition of pseudo-foreign corporations that is not
32. 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
33. Two of the Fifth Circuit's assumptions-that the corporation did all of its
business in Louisiana and that a different result would have obtained if Delaware law
had been applied-have been questioned. Note, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations and the
"Internal Affairs" Rule, 1960 DuKE L.J 477 (1960).
34. Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La.
1958).
35. 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959).
36. 268 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959) (emphasis
in original).
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limited to corporations doing all of their business in the state. North
Carolina, in 1955, was the first state to attempt adoption of a statute
applying certain provisions of local corporation law to the internal
affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations. This controversial aspect was
eliminated, however, from the corporate act finally adopted." In 1963
New York adopted such a statute as part of the total revision of its
corporation law.38  This statute requires the application of certain pro-
visions of local law to a foreign corporation unless it does less than one-
half of its business in New York. Although similar in intent to the New
York statute, California's statute should provide a better test of the
approach, since California's specific aim is to extend to pseudo-foreign
corporations its traditional protection of the rights of shareholders and
creditors. New York, on the other hand, was as interested in liberaliz-
ing its entire statute to keep pace with the more permissive states as it
was in foreclosing use of foreign incorporations as a means of escaping
local regulation.3 9
California's Remedy
Section 211540 of the revised Corporations Code is the cornerstone
of California's new statutory attempt to assert some degree of regulatory
control over the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations operating
within the state. Subsection (a) defines which foreign corporations are
subject to California law, while subsection (b)4 makes specific code
sections governing domestic corporations applicable to the "subject"
foreign corporations. Thus, in the areas covered by these particular
sections, there is no distinction between the treatment of corporations
actually domiciled in California and pseudo-foreign corporations merely
operating in California. It is to be noted that not all of the California
Corporations Code is applied to a pseudo-foreign corporation. Rather,
the pseudo-foreign corporation must comply only with those sections
37. Latty, supra note 12, at 137 n.1.
38. New York's statute is phrased in the negative. The applicable statutes state
that they apply to all foreign corporations while another statute exempts corporations
which are listed on a national securities exchange or are not "psuedo-foreign." See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1317-20 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1975).
39. Citing one of their interim reports, Professor Henn states that "[olne ever-
present strand in the thinking of the Joint Legislative Committee was to 'foster New
York incorporation of businesses and retention of existing business corporations thereby
contributing to economic progress and opportunities for the citizens of our State."'
Henn, The Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 439, 453 (1962). Doubt concerning whether the New York law has an
impact on foreign corporations is heightened by the absence of reported cases decided
under them. One reason for this may be a major loophole in New York's statute. See
note 58 & accompanying text infra.
40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
41. See note 65 infra.
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which are enumerated, plus the sections applicable to all foreign corpo-
rations. 42
Section 2115(a): Two Tests Determine Whether a
Foreign Corporation is Subject to California Law
A foreign corporation is within the code sections enumerated in
section 2115(b) if it does intrastate business in California43 and satis-
fies two tests stated in section 2115(a). The first is a local business
test which requires that the foreign corporation do more than 50 percent
of its business in California. The percentage of business in California is
determined by averaging the corporation's property factor,44 payroll
factor, 45 and sales factor.46  These factors are already computed by
foreign corporations doing business in California to determine business
income apportionable to California for franchise tax purposes. Each
42. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2101, 2105, 2109, 2110, 2114 (West Supp.
1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
43. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2100 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). Regula-
tion of purely interstate commerce is likely to be a federal function. Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-69 (1945). For California's defini-
tion of transacting intrastate business, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 191 (West Supp. 1976)
(eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
44. "'The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value
of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in this
state during the income year and the denominator of which is the average value of all
the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the
income year." CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25129 (West 1970); see id. §§ 25130-31.
45. "The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount
paid in this state during the income year by the taxpayer for compensation, and the de-
nominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the income year."
CAL. Rev. & TAX. CODE § 25132 (West 1970); see id. § 25133.
46. "The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of
the taxpayer in this state during the income year, and the denominator of which is the
total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the income year." CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE
§ 25134 (West 1970); see id. §§ 23135-36.
47. "All business income shall be apportioned to this state by multiplying the in-
come by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three." CAL. Rev. & TAX. CODE
§ 25128 (West 1970).
In the tax area, "[t]he reasonableness of this formula has been repeatedly upheld.
It gives weight to the major elements responsible for the earning of income while, at
the same time, it strikes a balance between a formula containing a larger number of fac-
tors, which might prove cumbersome to administer, and a formula containing a fewer
number of factors, which might produce distorted results." Keesling & Warren, Califor-
nia's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (Part 11), 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
655 (1967). California's statutes for the allocation of corporate income are almost a
verbatim adoption of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act which was
drafted and sponsored by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws in 1957.
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factor represents California's percentage of the corporation's total activi-
ty in each of the three areas. If the average of the three factors exceeds
50 percent, the corporation satisfies the local business test and can be
said to do most of its business in California. The second test, which is
based on the degree of local ownership of the corporation, is satisfied if
more than one-half of the voting stock of the foreign corporation is
owned by persons having addresses in California.48
These two tests define the point at which California deems a
foreign corporation's connection with the state sufficient to justify regu-
lation of its internal affairs by California law. Since California's interest
under both tests must exceed 50 percent, the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion's connection to any other state or combination of states cannot be
greater than its connection to California. Thus, these tests assure that
California will not apply its law to corporations which are really national
entities.
California will obtain the data necessary to determine whether the
corporation is pseudo-foreign by requiring every foreign corporation
qualified to do business in California to file annually an officers' certifi-
cate stating the corporation's property, payroll, and sales factors and the
percentage of its voting stock that is held by Californians. 49  Since
reporting the percentage of business in California essentially involves
the mere transfer of figures already generated by the corporation for its
franchise tax reports, this aspect of the required report imposes no real
burden on the corporation. The annual computation of the percent of
voting securities held by persons with addresses in California also should
not impose a great burden on the foreign corporation. If the corpora-
tion has so many shareholders that a manual computation would be
burdensome, then it is probable that the shareholder records of the
corporation are computerized.
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). The fact
that California residents held about half of a corporation's outstanding stock was impor-
tant to the result in at least one case. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). The
property, payroll and sales factors are computed for the corporation's previous tax year.
Id. § 2115(a). The percent of voting securities held by persons with addresses in Cal-
ifornia is computed as of the last record date for a shareholders' meeting. Id. § 2108
(a) (1). If the California portion of the corporation's activities and ownership exceeds
50% on both of these tests, it becomes subject to California law on the first day of the
corporation's next fiscal year which commences thirty days or more after the report is
filed. Id. § 2115(c). The corporation ceases to be a pseudo-foreign corporation of Cal-
ifornia at the end of the fiscal year in which an annual report shows that the corporation
did not meet one of the tests. Id. § 2115(d). The penalty for not filing the required
report is mandatory forfeiture of the corporation's right to do intrastate business, but
the secretary of state may only do this after six month's notice of delinquency. Id.
§ 2108(d).
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Loopholes: Ample Means to Avoid the California Law
If a foreign corporation meeting the tests of section 2115 finds the
various applicable provisions of the new corporation law more onerous
than those of its domiciliary state, it will undoubtedly attempt to evade
the tests of section 2115. Efforts to avoid section 2115 can be expected
to take three general forms: (1) use of the statutory exemption of
corporations listed on certain national securities exchanges; (2) at-
tempts to reduce artificially California's interest as computed under
either of the two tests; and (3) actual reduction of the corporation's
connection to California.
First, it is important to note that section 2115 does not apply to
any corporation with outstanding securities listed on any national securi-
ties exchange certified by the commissioner of corporations under sec-
tion 25100(o) of the Corporations Code.50 The theory behind this
exemption is that when a corporation lists its shares on a national
exchange, it subjects itself to federal securities regulations and exchange
requirements which supposedly provide protection for investors equiva-
lent to that provided under California law. The exemption is only
rational, however, if the protection afforded under the federal statutes is
in fact equivalent.
The first thing to note about the exemption of listed corporations is
that both exchange regulations and federal securities law focus primarily
on disclosure of material information to shareholders and to the market-
place,r' thus duplicating some aspects of California's disclosure provi-
sions.52 They do not, however, deal with all of the areas California
considers important enough to apply to pseudo-foreign corporations. 53
For example, they do not provide standards for director election and
removal, a director's standard of care, and a right to cumulate votes in
the election of directors. As to such areas, the law of a corporation's
domicile would continue to control. This gap in California's effort to
set the standards of conduct for pseudo-foreign corporations brings into
question the propriety of this exemption. This concern is enhanced by
the fact that the divorce of shareholders and management which occurs
50. Id. § 2115(e). Apparently listed corporations are not even required to file
the officer's certificate. See id. § 2108(a).
The national securities exchanges certified to date by the commissioner of corpora-
tions under California Corporations Code section 25100(o) are the New York and
American Stock Exchanges. See Commissioner's Release No. 27-c (March 4, 1972).
The initial draft of the bill also provided for the exemption of corporations with out-
standing securities on the list of over-the-counter margin stocks issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A.B. 376 (1975) (as amended Aug. 5).
51. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78n (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); I-INN, supra note
25, at 627.
52. See notes 99-116 & accompanying text infra.
53. See note 65 infra.
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in larger corporations may create a greater need for shareholder protec-
tion. Arguably, national security exchanges provide another form of
protection. The existence of a public market enables the shareholder to
quit the corporation by selling his stock. This negative form of protec-
tion hardly seems sufficient to support the exemption, however, when
California does not exempt from these same provisions its domestic
corporations which are listed on the same national exchanges.
The second consideration involved in the listing exemption is that it
is only available to corporations of a large size. To be eligible for
listing, a corporation must meet certain minimum standards set by the
exchanges, including a minimum number of shareholders, a minimum
amount of tangible assets, and a minimum level of earning power.5" The
fact that this exemption is necessarily limited to larger corporations may
suggest that an important reason for its enactment was to avoid political
opposition from those corporations with the greatest power to prevent
the adoption of section 2115.
The other two methods a pseudo-foreign corporation might use to
avoid the more burdensome California requirements involve efforts to
fall below 50 percent on either of California's local interest tests.5 5 Since
California's interest in the corporation must exceed 50 percent under
both of these tests before the corporation is deemed a pseudo-foreign
corporation, the corporation need only bring itself below 50 percent on
one of them. It is reasonable to assume that pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions would prefer a cosmetic manipulation of these tests rather than any
real change in business practices that might prove unprofitable. Cosmet-
ic changes are more likely to be successful in evading the local owner-
ship test than in evading the local business test. This is so primarily
because the local business test is based on the factors used to allocate
corporate income to California for franchise tax purposes. 56 Short of
fraud, the computation of these factors is not susceptible of artificial
manipulation. And California did foreclose the one method a corpora-
tion might have used to maneuver around the local business test-the
formation of a controlled subsidiary to do all the California business for
the corporation. 57  California requires a parent and any subsidiary of
which it owns more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting shares to
report their income on a consolidated basis, after elimination of inter-
company transactions.5"
54. HENN, supra note 25, at 626.
55. See notes 43-48 & accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 44-47 & accompanying text supra.
57. Even though the subsidiary would meet the tests and become subject to Cal-
ifornia law, the controlling parent's internal affairs would remain relatively unaffected.
58. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2115(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). This
is apparently one loophole in the New York statute. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 448 n.39.
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On the other hand, there seems to be more room for manipulation
to bring local ownership below 50 percent, without actually changing
the true location of the ownership of the corporation. Local ownership
is tested by determining the percentage of the corporation's outstanding
voting securities held by persons having addresses in California, not the
percentage of shareholders in California. The key phrase in the test,
"held of record by persons having addresses in this state,"5 9 is new and
somewhat ambiguous. Does it provide for computation of local owner-
ship based on the addresses of the voting shareholders that appear on
the corporation's records or is the determination based on whether the
shareholder has an address in California, regardless of his address of
record? Certainly the former interpretation is more compatible with the
requirement that the corporation itself make the annual computation of
voting shares owned by Californians. Could corporations be expected
to ascertain whether a shareholder has any address in California?
If the address on which local ownership is tested is the address in
the corporate records, then only that address need be changed to effect a
reduction of California ownership. Thus shareholders who feel ade-
quately protected by the size of their holdings or who are aligned with
management may by sham transactions remove the corporation from the
coverage of California law. Such transactions could range from simply
having all correspondence from the corporations mailed to an address
outside California to the establishment of a voting trust in another
state.60 Such artificial manipulations could be prevented by interpret-
ing the phrase "having addresses in this state" to require that the shares
of a shareholder who has any address in California be counted as locally
owned. Another solution would be to construe the phrase as meaning
owned "either beneficially or of record;" this is the language of the New
York statute as originally enacted.61 Both solutions might place an
onerous record keeping burden on the corporation with no real means of
verification.
Despite such an interpretation, another method may exist to reduce
local ownership without changing the true location of the owners.
Apparently to solve the problem that arose in Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
59. CAL. CoRp. CoDE § 2115(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
60. This method would succeed because the trustee would be made the holder of
record.
61. Law of April 24, 1961, ch. 855, § 1317, [1961] N.Y. Laws 1670. This lan-
guage was part of the definition of a "domiciled foreign corporation" which was re-
pealed in 1962 before it had become effective. Law of April 24, 1962, ch. 834, §§ 88-
101, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2953-57. For a discussion of the approach which replaced
the short-lived concept of the domiciled foreign corporation, see note 38 & accompanying
text supra. The new California code provides a solution to a similar ownership problem
which might be applied here. See CAL. CoRp. CODE § 605(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff.
Jan. 1, 1977).
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Sobieski, 2 where approximately 50 percent of the corporation's shares
were held by broker-dealers and the court refused to make assumptions
about whether Californians owned those shares, California added the
provision that "[f]or the purpose of this subdivision, any securities held
to the knowledge of the issuer in the names of broker-dealers or nomi-
nees for broker-dealers shall not be considered outstanding. ' 63  This
provision could backfire badly in that it enables California owners to
place their shares in the names of broker-dealers and avoid having those
shares counted as locally owned.64 Militating against this result is the
possible loss of the right to vote the shares that might occur, depending
upon the relationship of dealer and owner.
Such devices may be most useful to closely held foreign corpora-
tions, to foreign corporations in which a few shareholders own large
blocks of stock, or to foreign corporations in which California owner-
ship is only marginally more than one-half. It should be remembered
that many of the corporations California attempts to capture moved
their domiciles from California to the states which give management a
freer hand and shareholders less protection. That a sufficient number
of shareholders were willing to approve such a move may indicate that a
sufficient number would also be willing to participate in an evasion of
the local ownership test.
The final means to avoid California law would be for the corpora-
tion to make an actual reduction of its connection with California to
below 50 percent under either the local business or local ownership test.
To reduce the level of local ownership, shareholders of major blocks
could be convinced to move from California, or perhaps the corporation
could market future shares only outside of California. A sufficient
reduction of local business could be accomplished by relocating parts of
the corporation's operation in other states, by expanding in other states
rather than in California, or simply by making property investments in
other states. Note, though, that a reduction of California's share of
either payroll, property, or sales will not defeat the local business test if
the average of the three exceeds 50 percent. To the extent pseudo-
foreign corporations use this method to avoid California's corporation
law, California will have driven out corporate activity which would have
produced local jobs and taxes.
Section 2115(b): The Law Applicable to Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations
Section 2115(b) enumerates the California statutes applicable to
62. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
64. It certainly is not inconceivable that a court could be convinced on the proper
evidence to look through this or any of the other sham transactions discussed, to ascer-
tain the true nature of the corporation's connection with California.
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corporations which are pseudo-foreign under section 2115(a). Only
these select provisions of the Corporations Code are applied to the
subject foreign corporations.65
Before comparing these statutes. with provisions in the law of other
jurisdictions, an important question must be addressed: are these stat-
utes intended to operate only in California or to apply to the corporation
throughout its operation? Since the statutes made applicable to pseudo-
foreign corporations concern corporate internal affairs, each of which is
generally done only once for the entire corporation and for which the
corporation may have only one policy,66 these standards must apply
throughout the corporation. For instance, either the corporation pays a
certain dividend to all its shareholders or it cannot pay it to any
shareholders; it either indemnifies a director or it does not; and either all
shareholders have the right to cumulate votes or they do not. In such
situations the corporation can be held to only one standard of conduct if
parity is to exist among equal members of the corporation and if the
corporation is not to be broken de facto into smaller units.
This is not to suggest that California law will be in irreconcilable
conflict with the law of the foreign corporation's domicile. California
provides for higher standards of corporate conduct than those provided
by other states.6 7  Corporate law tends not to be a set of hard and fast
rules under which conflicts between different state schemes must of
65. Section 2115(b) reads as follows: "'he following chapters and sections of
this division shall apply to a foreign corporation subject to this section (to the exclusion
of the law of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated): Chapter 1 (general provisions
and definitions), to the extent applicable to the following provisions; Section 301 (an-
nual election of directors); Section 303 (removal of directors without cause); Section
304 (removal of directors by court proceedings); Section 305, subd. (c) (filling of direc-
tor vacancies where less than a majority in office elected by shareholders); Section 309
(directors' standard of care); Section 316 (excluding subdivisions (a) (3) and (f)(3))
(liability of directors for unlawful distributions); Section 317 (indemnification of di-
rectors, officers, and others); Sections 500 through 505 (limitations on corporate distri-
butions in cash or property); Section 506 (liability of shareholder who receives unlawful
distribution); Section 600, subdivisions (b) and (c) (requirement for annual sharehold-
ers' meeting and remedy if same not timely held); Section 708, subdivisions (a), (b)
and (c) (shareholder's right to cumulate votes at any election of directors); Chapter
12 (reorganizations); Chapter 13 (dissenters' rights); Sections 1500 and 1501 (records
and reports); Chapter 16 (rights of inspection)." CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (West
Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
In applying only selected provisions, which reveal a strong legislative policy for pro-
tecting local interests as defined by the 50% tests, California follows the suggestion of
Latty. See Latty, supra note 12, at 159-60.
66. See note 2 supra.
67. Occasionally a statute may provide that a higher standard may be adopted by
the corporation. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 305(c), 3632 (West 1955 & Supp. 1976)
(eff. until Jan. 1, 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b) (1), (4), 141(b), (h), 229,
251(f) (1974 & Supp. 1975).
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necessity arise; rather each state merely sets the minimum standards it
considers necessary to protect and promote the various interests. Thus,
in most cases a foreign corporation will satisfy the low standards of its
domiciliary law by meeting the more rigorous standards set by Califor-
nia.68 But the corporation's need for a single standard of conduct
remains.69 What California proposes to do is to step into the position
presently occupied by the domiciliary state and supply the standards for
the corporation."
If California law is to displace the law of the domiciliary state as
the single standard of conduct for the pseudo-foreign corporation, courts
in all states must apply the California standards to the pseudo-foreign
corporations of California which are before them. This entails the
abandonment of the age-old conflict of laws principles which sends
courts for guidance to the law of the corporation's domicile. A new
conflicts rule must be adopted; the state with the predominant interest,
defined as an interest in excess of one-half, should be able to claim the
right to govern the corporation's internal affairs. To effect this change,
California should undertake a serious effort to educate other states on
the equities of such a solution. A properly mounted public relations
campaign would gain allies for California in its battle to overcome the
general conflict of laws rule favoring the domiciliary state. In addition,
68. One area on which California law and domiciliary law might conflict is the
question of removal of a director without cause. See notes 87-97 & accompanying text
infra.
69. This argument is stressed in Reese & Kaufman, supra note 2, at 1125-26.
The need for a single standard is well founded, both on the need for equal treatment
within the same class of a corporation's members and on considerations of corporate ef-
ficiency. Certainly it would be both unequal and chaotic if different states measured
the same conduct by different standards and reached different results. Consider the fea-
sibility of a system in which shareholders in one state were given the right to cumulate
votes while in another shareholders were denied that right.
An additional consideration is the need for predictability in corporate law. It is
important for the corporation to know with at least some certainty whether a given
course of action will withstand challenge. It should be recognized that the need for a
single standard explains in large measure the vitality of the rule that courts look to the
law of the corporation's domicile for governance of the corporation's internal affairs.
70. An interesting problem will arise where California's law is less strict than the
domiciliary law. A concrete example is the difference between the requirements of Cal-
ifornia and Delaware as to the amount of time that must have passed since the last an-
nual meeting before shareholders may initiate a court action to compel the holding of
the meeting. Delaware has a shorter time limit and thus provides greater shareholder
protection. See note 74 & accompanying text infra. Since California's interest is share-
holder protection, arguably where the domiciliary's standard is more protective of share-
holders, the domiciliary's standard could be used. The better analysis may be, however,
that both the adoption of a standard that California believes to be adequate and the need
for uniformity require that California's standard always override domiciliary law even
where the California standard is less strict.
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to aid courts both within and without California, there should be clear
identification of these corporations. This could be accomplished by
public lists issued and updated regularly by the secretary of state.
Burdens Imposed by the California Law
We come now to the question whether California's statutes will
impose upon pseudo-foreign corporations a significantly higher standard
of conduct than that imposed by the law of their domiciles. A complete
comparison of California's statutory corporate law with that of all other
states is beyond the scope of this note. However, emphasis will be
placed upon certain key provisions of California law which the new
statute renders applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations, the attempt
being to determine in broad terms whether such provisions are signifi-
cantly more onerous than the comparable provisions under Delaware
law. This analysis should first indicate what kinds of shareholder and
creditor protection are at stake in the battle between California and the
permissive states. Second, it will provide some insight into the vigor
with which corporations can be expected to resist California's attempt to
apply its local law to them.
Election of Directors: Burden Significantly Greater Under California Law
The first statutes to be examined are those dealing with shareholder
meetings and the election of directors of the corporation. California's
new corporations law requires all domestic and pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions to hold an annual meeting to elect directors."1 This section is
taken from Delaware law.7 2 If the annual meeting is not held within a
given time, the superior court is empowered, upon application of any
shareholder and after notice to the corporation, to order the meeting to
be held.78 Delaware also provides for similar enforcement, but interest-
ingly, Delaware has shorter requirements as to the amount of time which
must elapse before shareholders may proceed in court.74 Most states
have similar requirements and provide a way for shareholders to compel
the corporation to hold the meeting.75
To provide minority shareholders with the means to acquire repre-
sentation on the board of directors, the new California law has a unique
71. CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1974).
73. CAL. CoR. CODE § 600(c) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). The pe-
riod is sixty days after the date for the annual meeting or, if none is designated, the
period is fifteen months after either the organization of the corporation or the last an.
nual meeting.
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1974). Delaware requires thirty days to
have elapsed since the designated date for a meeting or thirteen months to have elapsed
since the last annual meeting.
75. See HENN, supra note 25, 375-76.
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cumulative voting statute applicable as well to pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions. Under this statute a shareholder may not cumulate his votes 76 if no
shareholder has given notice at the meeting prior to the vote that he
intends to cumulate his votes. But once notice has been given, all
shareholders may cumulate votes, so long as the names of the candidates
for whom votes will be cumulated were placed in nomination prior to
the voting.77
Although all but three states have statutes which pertain to cumu-
lative voting,78 many, including Delaware, simply permit the corporation
to decide for itself whether shareholders may ctmulate votes. 9 Since
the corporation's majority, which probably will see cumulative voting as
a threat to its power, determines the corporation's policy on this subject,
the right California gives every shareholder to cumulate votes after
notice could result in a significant change for pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions.
Even where shareholders have the right to cumulate votes, how-
ever, devices such as staggered or classified boards often exist to dilute
the potency of the right to cumulative voting by reducing the number of
positions on which an individual shareholder may vote. California rules
out staggered boards80 by requiring that "[alt each annual meeting
directors shall be elected to hold office until the next annual meet-
ing. "8 This section obviously mandates the election of the entire
board at each annual meeting. Other means of diluting the effect of
cumulative voting are available in California. For example, the articles
of incorporation may provide that shareholders are to vote by class or
series. 2 This is a device which can be used to reduce the number of
votes an individual shareholder has to cumulate. For instance, a share-
holder may be a member of a class which has the right to elect only one
76. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). For Califor-
nia's present cumulative voting statute, see CAL. CoRP.- CODE § 2235 (West 1955) (eff.
until Jan. 1, 1977).
77. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). These
notice requirements were included to "promote fairness in the use of cumulative voting
.... .REVISION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 88. The California statute is
unique because it provides for notice any time before the vote. This may raise substan-
tial problems with regard to the solicitation of proxies.
78. The states are Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. MODEL
ACT, supra note 22, at § 33, para. 4, % 3.04 (Supp. 1973).
79. See, e.g., id., § 33, para. 4; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974).
80. There is an argument that staggered terms for directors provide for more con-
tinuity on the board of directors and are more efficient in that longer periods mean di-
rectors have a chance to educate themselves more completely and to put their knowledge
to use. This argument is at least partially answered by the fact that, even where entire
boards are elected annually, the same persons are frequently reelected repeatedly.
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
82. Id.
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or two or even no directors. 83 Also, California sets no minimum
number of directors that a pseudo-foreign corporation must have,84 so
that a straight reduction of the number of directorships to the minimum
set by domiciliary law could be used to diminish the effect of Califor-
nia's cumulative voting requirement.8 5 Other means to mitigate the
effectiveness of a cumulative statute, such as issuing nonvoting shares,
setting up voting trusts and voting agreements, or having the board act
through committees are available to the extent such rights exist under
the law of the corporation's domicile.8
Thus, in the area'of election of directors, the greatest burden of
California law is its cumulative voting provision. Although means may
exist to dilute the effect of this statute, such means are themselves
burdensome. Management's notorious dislike for cumulative voting
suggests that this provision of the California law alone may be sufficient
to cause foreign corporations to avoid becoming subject to California
law.
Removal of Directors: The Burden Varies
California provides that the shareholders of a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration may remove without cause any or all of the corporation's
directors by a vote of the majority of the outstanding shares, subject to
provisions protecting cumulative and class voting procedures.8 7  Pre-
83. However, for a corporation which has only one class of shareholders to sub-
divide into several classes may be a difficult and costly process, as the shareholders must
be convinced to surrender their old shares for new ones with different rights.
84. California requires that domestic corporations have at least three directors, ex-
cept where the corporation has two or fewer shareholders. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 212(a)
(West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
85. A large board has certain advantages, such as providing more persons to do
the board's work and providing a greater diversity of viewpoints, which may make a re-
duction in the number of board seats an unappealing means to avoid cumulative voting.
In a section not applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations, California protects cu-
mulative voting in domestic corporations against such an attack by providing that a re-
duction of "the minimum number of directors cannot be adopted if the votes cast against
its adoption ... would be sufficient to elect at least one director if voted cumulatively
at an election at which all of the outstanding shares entitled to vote were voted and the
entire number of previously authorized directors were then being elected." Id.
86. In a California domestic corporation, the board may act through committees,
may issue nonvoting shares, and the shareholders may create voting trusts. Id. §§ 311,
400, 706. These sections are not applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations.
87. Id. § 303. Cumulative voting is protected by providing that "[n]o director
may be removed (unless the entire board is removed) when the votes cast against re-
moval... would be sufficient to elect such director if voted cumulatively at an election
at which the same total number of votes were cast ... and the entire number of direc-
tors authorized at the time of the director's most recent election were then being elected
... ." Id. § 303(a) (1). Where class voting is provided for in the articles, it is pro-
tected by the provision that any director elected under class voting "may be removed
sumably, directors have the normal fights of notice and opportunity to
be heard although they are not specified in California's statute.8 8 In
adopting removal without cause, California follows the theory that
since the shareholders are the owners of the corporation they
should have complete power to control management. . . . Thus,
the right to remove hinges not upon the propriety of a director's
conduct but upon the bare question whether the shareholders desire
to retain him .... 89
Through a possible oversight, there is a means specifically denied
to domestic corporations by which pseudo-foreign corporations can
protect directors from removal even beyond the protections afforded by
the cumulative voting procedures. 90 Domestic corporations are prohib-
ited from placing in their articles a supermajority vote requirement for
director removal. 9 ' This section, however, does not apply to the pseudo-
foreign corporation. If the domiciliary law permits, a supermajority
vote requirement for director removal could be adopted by the Califor-
nia pseudo-foreign corporation.
In addition to providing for removal without cause, California
retains its provision empowering a superior court of the county where
the principal office of the corporation is located to remove a director for
"fraudulent or dishonest acts or gross abuse of authority or discretion
. . "9 Such a suit must be initiated by shareholders holding at least
10 percent of the outstanding shares of any class. 93 This section is
applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations.
While many corporation codes outside California deal with the
removal of directors, a good number, including Delaware's, do not. As
to Delaware, Professor Folk states, "Unlike many other state statutes,
the Delaware law does not deal expressly with removal of directors...
[but] stockholders of a corporation clearly have the inherent power to
remove one or more directors for cause. '94 A leading example of this
inherent power is the famous case of Campbell v. Loew's, Inc.,95 where
only by the applicable vote of the holders of the shares of that class or series." Id.
§ 303(a) (2).
88. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
89. MODEL AcT, supra note 22, § 39.
90. See note 87 supra.
91. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 204(a) (5) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). A su-
permajority vote requirement is a provision, generally contained in the corporation's arti-
cles, which requires the vote of all or of a large proportion of a class or series of shares
to approve a particular action.
92. Id. § 304.
93. Id. As the statute reads, apparently 10% of the shareholders of one class may
even initiate the removal proceedings of a director elected by another class.
94. E. FOLK, THE DELAWAR GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 57 (1972).
95. 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
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a director was removed for cause by a simple majority even though he
was elected under cumulative voting required by the certificate of incor-
poration. Although the court recognized the "possibility of stockholder
removal action designed to circumvent the effect of cumulative voting
S. ." it found that this was outweighed by the consideration that a
director should not be "free to continue such damage merely because he
was elected under a cumulative voting provision."9 In addition, Dela-
ware has upheld removal without cause pursuant to a bylaw authorizing
such action.97
Whether California's director removal statutes are more of a bur-
den to management than the right of shareholders to remove directors
under Delaware case law is a question complicated by California's
protection of cumulative voting rights. In providing for removal with-
out cause in all cases, California law is more burdensome than Dela-
ware's. The additional power of a court to remove for cause may also
increase the burden under California law, as shareholders are given an
alternate means to accomplish removal. Yet, because the provision
added for the protection of cumulative voting applies to the removal of
any director-even a director not elected under cumulative voting-the
ultimate assessment of the burden on management is dependent upon
who elected the director being removed. Where the director was elected
under cumulative voting and represents minority shareholders who
would otherwise not have a voice in management, then the statute can
be said to burden management. Where the statute intended to protect
cumulative voting operates to prevent the removal of a director not
elected under cumulative voting, management may be more protected by
California law than by Delaware's.
Corporate Records and Disclosures: Burdens Significantly
Greater Under California Law
California deems some aspects of its law dealing with corporate
records sufficiently important to apply them to pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions.98 California also gives the shareholder with a purpose "reasona-
96. Id. at 573, 134 A.2d at 858.
97. See Everett v. Transnation Dev. Corp., 267 A.2d 627 (Del. Ch. 1970).
98. Some of these sections also apply to any foreign corporation having its princi-
pal executive office in California or customarily holding meetings of its board in this
state, thus preventing a foreign corporation from establishing headquarters in California
to avoid the reporting requirements of its domicile. CAI. CoRP. CODE §§ 1501(h), 1601
(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). California requires that pseudo-foreign cor-
porations keep adequate and correct records and books of account, a record of its share-
holders, and the minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders, board, or committees
of the board. Id. § 1500. The minutes must be kept in written form, while the corpo-
rate records and shareholders list may be kept in any form capable of being converted
to written form. Id. If the records are not kept in written form, the corporation has
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bly related" to his interests as a shareholder the right to inspect during
normal business hours the corporation's "accounting books and records
and minutes." 99  This follows the pattern in most states of allowing
shareholders a qualified right of inspection.100 In California, this right
extends to the records of each subsidiary of the corporation. The right
of inspection may be exercised by an agent or attorney, 101 may not be
limited by the articles or bylaws, 02 and can be enforced through the
courts. 03 The proper superior court is given the discretion to set the
conditions of inspection and to order an independent audit. Delaware
law generally imposes the same requirements.10
Except in the case of a corporation with less than 100 shareholders
of record which has expressly waived this requirement in its bylaws, 10
every corporation must make an annual report to shareholders within
120 days of the close of its fiscal year containing the corporation's
balance sheet, an income statement, and a statement of changes in
financial position in the fiscal year.10  In addition, a shareholder or
shareholders of at least 5 percent of the outstanding shares of any class
have the right to demand balance sheets and income statements for the
three-month, six-month, or nine-month period of the corporation's cur-
rent fiscal year ending more than 30 days prior to the date of the
request.'0 7 If the corporation compiles such interim analysis, either on
request of 5 percent of any class or for its own use, a copy of that
interim report must be kept on file for 12 months and exhibited to any
shareholder requesting to examine it.'0 8 The corporation is also re-
quired to supply or mail to any shareholder so requesting, a copy of the
last income statement and balance sheet the corporation has prepared.' 019
not complied with a request for inspection until it has made them available in written
form at the corporation's expense. Id. § 1605.
99. Id. § 1601(a). Confusion may arise because this section expressly applies
only to those "foreign corporation[s] keeping any such records in this state or having
its principal executive office in this state." This phrase should be interpreted as relating
only to genuine foreign corporations and not to psuedo-foreign corporations, which
should be subject to this section no matter where their records are kept.
100. See HENN, supra note 25, at 395-402.
101. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1603. The court also may award reimbursement to the shareholder for
his reasonable expenses in connection with such a proceeding if it finds his demand was
proper and failure to comply unjustified. Id. § 1604.
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974).
105. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 1501(c). Annual reports and interim statements of earnings are typic-
ally required of corporations whose shares are listed on national securities exchanges.
See HENN, supra note 25, at 626-27.
108. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(c) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
109. Id. § 1501(d). Delaware has no provision requiring interim financial re-
ports.
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Superior courts of the proper county are empowered to enforce the
shareholders' right to reports, extend the time limits in which the
corporation may comply or award the shareholder reimbursement for
expenses he has incurred to enforce these rights.110
California's provisions defining the shareholder's right to inspect
and providing a means to enforce it are fairly typical, as shareholder
inspection rights were recognized at common law to facilitate a share-
holder's protection of his investment."' In giving any shareholder with
a "proper" purpose the right to inspect the corporation's financial
records, California differs slightly from the position taken by the thirty-
five states which condition the right to inspect upon ownership of stock
for a minimum period or upon ownership of a minimum percentage of
stock." '2 Delaware also does not so condition the right of a shareholder
with a proper purpose,"' and neither California nor Delaware follow the
1969 amendment to the Model Business Corporation Act adding the
limitation that the right extends only to "relevant" books." 4
The California law on disclosure to shareholders does differ, how-
ever, from other state statutes in its requirement that the corporation
disclose various significant transactions between the corporation and
certain of its "insiders.""' 5 Any corporation with 100 or more share-
holders which is not regulated under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (or is exempt from such requirements by section 12g
of that act) must disclose this information in its annual report unless
the transaction was approved by the shareholders. This disclosure re-
quirement is new to California and unique among state statutory
schemes; although, as the exemptions suggest, federal securities law re-
quires similar disclosures." 6
110. Id. § 1501(f), (g). Delaware has similar provisions for court enforcement
of shareholder inspection rights. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974).
111. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(f), (g) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); MODEL Acr, supra note 22, § 52.
112. Id.
113. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 220 (1974).
114. . MODEL Acr, supra note 22, § 52. The comment states that this addition was
made to protect "against the possibility of expensive and vexatious fishing expeditions."
Although this addition removes any chance for doubt, it says no more than what the
proper purpose requirement already provides.
115. According to section 1501(b), if the corporation has 100 or more holders of
record, the corporation must disclose information concerning: (1) any transaction in-
volving an amount in excess of $40,000 in which any director or officer or any holder
of more than 10% of the outstanding voting shares had a direct or indirect material
interest; and (2) any indemnification or advances aggregating more than $10,000, paid
during the fiscal year to any officer or director pursuant to California's indemnification
statute. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
116. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(f) (1975).
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Thus, in the area of corporate records and disclosures, California
differs materially from other states in two ways which could have
significant impact on the pseudo-foreign corporation-the ability of 5
percent of the shares to demand interim income reports and the require-
ment of disclosure of the corporation's material inside transactions. The
right to demand interim income reports could impose a significant
accounting burden on smaller corporations, but it will probably not have
much of an impact upon larger corporations because they are likely to
have generated the necessary data already. What shareholders will do
with the additional information cannot be forecasted. The right to
demand such interim statements, however, at least creates the opportuni-
ty to follow their investment more closely and to react more quickly to
changes in the corporation's financial condition. The exposure of
certain dealings between the corporation and insiders obviously has the
potential for a dramtic and chilling impact on transactions with insiders
tending to outrage the shareholders.
Shareholder Lists: Access Substantially the Same
Corporations statutes, including Delaware's, typically provide
shareholders with a right to inspect the list of shareholders of the
corporation." 7 This right is fundamental to the shareholder's ability to
communicate with fellow shareholders of the corporation, especially to
solicit their proxy on any matter. California's statutory coverage of this
area is applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations. In general California
conditions this right upon the shareholder's having a purpose reasonably
related to his interest as a shareholder. 18 One aspect of the California
statute which may present management with a greater burden than that
present in other states is the unique provision that a block of at least 5
percent of the outstanding voting shares of a corporation (or 1 percent
if the block has filed a Schedule 14B 10 with the Securities Exchange
Commission) has an absolute right to inspect and copy the shareholders
list or to obtain from the corporation's transfer agent, upon five days
written demand and payment of the costs involved, a list of those
shareholders entitled to vote. 2 '
117. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); MODEL AcT, supra note 22, § 52;
HENN, supra note 25, at 395-402.
118. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600(c) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). The
California statute does not allocate the burden of proof on the issue of whether the
shareholder has a proper purpose. Delaware places the burden on the corporation to
show an improper purpose. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (1974).
119. A Schedule 14B must be filed by every participant in an election contest be-
fore soliciting proxies from other shareholders. The schedule requires information on
the identity of each participant in the election contest, the extent of the participant's
interest in the securities of the issuer and other significant information about the par-
1icipant. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1975).
120. CAL, CORP. CODE § 1600(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977). Califor-
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Miscellaneous: Some Areas Where California Law
May Be Beneficial to Management
To provide a balanced presentation of the burdens imposed, some
additional areas of the California law applicable to pseudo-foreign
corporations deserve mention. One of these is the statute delineating
the standard of care for corporate directors. California's standard is the
normal standard of "good faith" and "such care . .. as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circum-
stances" except that California adds the language "including reasonable
inquiry" to its formulation. 121  It is possible that the addition of this
phrase might be interpreted to require a director to make an inquiry
regardless of the circumstances. The revision committee report clearly
states, however, that there was no intention to change the usual standard
and that this phrasing was added only "to make explicit . . . that
reasonable care under some circumstances could include a duty of
inquiry."'1 22  According to the drafting committee, such circumstances
arise when a director "is put on notice by the presence of suspicious
circumstances."'1 23 This section also identifies certain persons and ma-
terials on which a director may rely in performing his duties. 24
A contract or other transaction in which a director has a material
financial interest is not ordinarily within the business judgment rule. A
section of the California Corporation Code, however, provides that if
such contract or transaction is independently and in good faith approved
by a properly informed board or shareholder meeting, the decision is
thereby brought under the protection of the business judgment rule. 2 5
Curiously, the benefits of this section are not made available to pseudo-
foreign corporations. 26  But identical benefits are provided by Dela-
nia's grant of an absolute right to obtain the shareholders list exceeds proxy rule 14a-7
under which the corporation has the option of mailing the material for the shareholder
or surrendering a copy of the shareholders list. Also, rule 14a-7 does not apply unless
management has made or intends to make any solicitation of proxies. 17 C.F.R. § 240.
14a-7 (1975).
121. CAL. Corn. CODE § 309(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
122. REVISION COMMITrE REPORT, supra note 29, at 49-50.
123. Id. at 50.
124. According to section 309(b) a director is entitled to rely on opinions or re-
search of (1) officers and employees whom the director believes to be competent, (2)
professionals, and (3) committees of the board upon which the director does not serve
and which he believes to merit confidence. The section requires of the director good
faith and reasonable inquiry where the circumstances warrant it. CAL. CORP. CODE §
309(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
125. Id. § 310.
126. This section is referred to in section 1501(b).(1) as a method of avoiding dis-
closure of certain inside transactions in the annual report, and presumably pseudo-for-
eign corporations may make use of the shareholder approval provision for that purpose.
See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
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ware law,1 7 which will serve to fill this gap.
California's unique provisions regarding corporate mergers' 2 and
dissenters' rights2 9 also apply to pseudo-foreign corporations. This
discussion will merely highlight those features of the California law
beneficial to management which may not exist under the law of the
pseudo-foreign corporation's domicile. In its revised code, California
adopts "a new system for regulating corporate combinations which
treats, to the extent feasible, all reorganizations. . . in the same manner
so far as the requirement for shareholder approval and the existence of
dissenters' rights are concerned."'180 Reorganization, a new term of art
in the California code, encompasses all three basic methods of corporate
combination-merger, exchange, and sale of assets. 131  By treating all
three in the same manner, California recognizes explicitly in statute
what other states have recognized only judicially under the de facto
merger doctrine-that all are means to the same end.
Approval by the board of each party to a reorganization is general-
ly required, 132 while shareholder approval is only required for "acts
which result in significant changes in the rights or interests of sharehold-
ers."' 8 Whether significant change exists is determined under what
may be called a "dilution test."'8 4 Approval of the outstanding shares
of each class is required unless the corporation itself or the persons who
are shareholders of the corporation before the reorganization will own,
immediately after the reorganization, more than 5/6 of the equity
securities of the surviving or acquiring corporation. 13 5 In other words,
if the same shareholders will still own 5/6 of the voting shares of the
corporation after it combines with another, their rights have not been
diluted, and they are not afforded the right to vote on whether to approve
the transaction." 6
An appraisal remedy, called "dissenters' rights" in California's
revised code, exists only if the shareholder had a right to vote on
whether or not to approve the reorganization.'8 7  A shareholder who
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
128. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200, 1201 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
129. Id. §§ 1300-12.
130. REVISION COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 14.
131. CAL. Cop. CODE § 181 (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
132. Id. § 1200.
133. REVISION COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 93-94.
134. Id. at 94.
135. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(b) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
136. Approval is required despite meeting the 516 rule if: (1) an amendment is
made to the articles which would require such approval; (2) shares of a class will receive
different rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions than those surrendered; or (3)
shareholders of close corporations will receive in exchange the shares of a corporation
which is not closely held. Id. §§ 1201 (c), (d), (e).
137. Id. § 1300.
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can establish his shares as dissenting has a right to demand that the
corporation purchase them at their fair market value as of the day before
the announcement of the reorganization. To qualify his shares as
dissenting, a shareholder must not have voted them in favor of the
reorganization, must make a demand on the corporation for payment
and must submit the shares for endorsement. 138
Dissenters' rights do not exist for shares in which there is a public
market immediately prior to the reorganization, unless there is a restric-
tion on the transfer of the shares or 5 percent of the shares of a class file
a demand for payment from the corporation. 13 9 This exception is based
on the theory that a shareholder's interests are adequately protected if he
can sell his shares. 40 The right of 5 percent of the shares of a class to
demand repurchase of their shares protects shareholders in the event
that the terms of the reorganization are so unfair that the market price
of the stock has plummeted.
Although appraisal remedies for some reorganizations exist statuto-
rily in all states but one,' 4 ' the California statute may be more beneficial
to pseudo-foreign corporations because California (1) includes a sale of
assets in its definition of reorganization, and (2) makes dissenters'
rights the shareholder's exclusive remedy in most situations. If a share-
holder has dissenters' rights, then he does not have "any right at law or
in equity to attack the validity of the reorganization or merger, or to
have the reorganization or merger set aside or rescinded . . ,' . The
only attack that a shareholder with dissenters' rights can make is to test
the legality of voting procedures.' 43 Thus, these sections are of obvious
benefit to corporate management contemplating participation in a reor-
ganization.
Burdens Summarized
The impact of California's law on pseudo-foreign corporations is
mixed. There are several areas, notably the cumulative voting provision
and the disclosure requirements where there is insider dealing, in which
the California law is apt to be significantly more burdensome for
138. Id. § 1300(b).
139. Id. § 1300(b)(1).
140. See REVISION COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 29, at 96-97.
141. The dissenting state is West Virginia. See MoDEL Acr, supra note 22, § 81.
142. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(a) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
143. An exception exists where one corporation in the reorganization is "con-
trolled" by another corporation in the reorganization. In such a case a shareholder in
the "controlled" corporation who has not demanded payment may attack the reorganiza-
tion. Id. § 1312(b). By attacking the transaction, however, the shareholder forfeits
the right to demand payment for his shares.
"Control" is defined as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a corporation." Id. § 160.
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pseudo-foreign corporations than their domiciliary law would be. Cali-
fornia's law in other areas, such as the reports and records which a
corporation is required to make, shareholder access to such information,
and the provisions on director removal, will impose only slightly greater
burdens. In still other areas corporate management may find California
law more favorable than the law of the state in which they are incorpo-
rated.
Without doubt, the opportunity to avoid the application of Califor-
nia law by falling outside the subject group will cause management to
consider whether California law should be avoided. The methods
corporations will use to evaluate the overall impact of the new California
law can only be a matter of conjecture. Management might balance the
benefits under California law against the burdens it presents in light of
its own internal variables, in which case decisions will vary with the
corporation. It may be more realistic, however, to assume that manage-
ment will look only to the burdens which are present under California
law and which do not exist under the law of states with pro-management
corporate statutes. What management will find is that the new Califor-
nia law contains two requirements generally disfavored by
management-cumulative voting on directors and disclosure of inside
dealing. Based on the presence of these alone, management easily
could conclude that there is good reason to avoid the application of
California law.
Conclusion
To prevent truly local corporations from domiciling themselves in
more permissive states for the purpose of evading local law, California
has enacted a new statute which applies some of its local law to foreign
corporations in which California's connection to the corporation pre-
dominates over the connection of any other state or combination of
states. Although not without problems, the tests under which Califor-
nia determines that its interest predominates are rational and functional.
Many of the loopholes that appear to exist can be closed by legislative
action or by a watchful judiciary. Under this system, one danger always
looms in the background-the reduction of a corporation's business in
California to avoid application of California law. This should not
be a great danger, however, because the nature of California law will be
but one factor in a corporation's decision where to do business.
California's application of its law to pseudo-foreign corporations is
likely to be challenged on constitutional grounds, although apparently
the similar New York law has never been so challenged.' Inevitably
either California law will be set up as a defense to a suit brought under
144. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 449.
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the law of the state of incorporation or the domiciliary law will be raised
as a defense to proceedings under California law. In either event, this
brings into focus the question of the effect which one state is required to
give to the corporate statutes of another state under the full faith and
credit clause. 45 Once the question is raised, it is hoped that the
Supreme Court will resolve it in a clear fashion to prevent justice from
degenerating into a race to the most advantageous courtroom. 14 6
Certainly the 50 percent tests employed by California provide a
rational means to allocate the regulation of a corporation to the state to
which it is primarily related. If such a state exists, arguably it has the
better claim on the power to regulate that corporation's internal affairs
than does a state which the corporation itself has for convenience chosen
to call home. Even if California's system were adopted nationally, not
all corporations would be allocated to a single state as not all have a
connection to one particular state that exceeds 50 percent on the tests
enumerated. Such corporations are really more national than local. For
these, it may make most sense that they be required to meet standards
formulated by all the states. Perhaps it is this group to which any
federal incorporation proposal should address itself. Such an allocation
of the responsibility for corporate regulation would retain autonomy for
the individual state where there is a legitimate claim to such autonomy,
but would also allow for regulation on a national scale where there is a
national interest. Congress has the Constitutional power to establish
the effect the law of one state will receive in another state, 147 and it
could take the first step toward implementing such a system by legislat-
ing a conflict of laws rule based on the reasoning if not the language of
California's law. Congressional establishment of a rule that the regulat-
ing state shall be the state to which a corporation is predominantly
related would bring both clarity and equity to this area of the law.
John Hugh Newman*
145. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
146. Another ground for challenging the new statute is that it violates the constitu-
tional prohibition of the impairment of existing contracts contained in article I, section
10 of the United States Constitution. Courts have long treated relations between a cor-
poration and the state creating it as matters of contract. See Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). This treatment has been ex-
ended to relations between shareholder and corporation and shareholder and share-
holder. See HENN, supra note 25, at 694-99. The contract clause is not, however, an
absolute prohibition, and the government is allowed to infringe on existing contract
rights when reasonable. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934).
147. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
* Member, Third Year Class
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